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The concept of enterprise risk management (ERM) as a holistic approach
to managing a company’s risk proﬁ le has tremendous appeal. However,
companies are frequently skeptical about its value and whether the results
will justify the cost, eff ort, and challenges of implementing a meaningful
ERM process.1 This report considers some of those concerns and highlights
the governance, compliance, and cultural value of ERM.
Risk management is not a new concept. Companies have 
been, at the very least, considering and modeling financial risk 
for quite some time.2 ERM is a holistic approach to managing 
a company’s risk profile.3 It encourages boards of directors to 
foster and embrace a risk-aware culture that supports firm-
wide communication. By empowering individuals at multiple 
levels within and across an organization to identify, assess, 
and communicate about risk exposure, boards can more 
effectively work with their management teams to mitigate 
and monitor risks.4 The objective of ERM is not to eliminate 
all risks, but rather to maintain a level of risk that aligns 
with the company’s risk appetite.5
Despite ERM’s potential benefits, conversations about 
implementing it are often informal, disjointed, siloed, and 
incomplete.6 Moreover, the failings of a company’s risk 
management approach typically are not exposed until times 
of crisis or distress. The corporate scandals of 2001–02 
and the economic recession of 2007–2008 offer numerous 
examples of risk management breakdowns and hindsight
or reactive responses to those failings.7
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An Overview of ERM Concepts
In business, tension often exists between risk management 
and profit maximization. Boards and managers must 
constantly strive to strike an appropriate balance between 
the two. The corporate scandals and general failures of 
the early 2000s highlighted the difficulties in managing 
this tension. In response, the government developed new 
risk-related disclosure regulations and a new framework for 
risk management.8 These included the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
new listing standards for the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), and the U.S. Department of Justice’s revised 
sentencing guidelines.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) developed an ERM 
framework to assist companies with operating in this new 
regulatory environment. ERM is “a process, effected by 
an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may 
affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives.” 9 ERM focuses on the 
potential risks to and related consequences for the entire 
company—not just the specific departments or units 
responsible for foreseeable risks or risk-seeking activities.10
Commentators frequently quote the 
proverb “no risk, no reward” in the 
business context. Yet, calculated 
risk is fundamentally diff erent 
from rash or unmitigated risk. 
The latter often leads to negative 
consequences, including signiﬁ cant 
economic losses, litigation, missed 
business opportunities, and failed 
business models. Boards must strive 
to proactively identify and evaluate 
their companies’ risk proﬁ les and 
accept only calculated risks that are 
commensurate with their companies’ 
risk appetites. ERM is a key tool in 
this endeavor.
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At its core, ERM encourages companies to develop a 
disciplined process for identifying, assessing, mitigating, 
and monitoring potential risks to the enterprise through 
both vertical and horizontal prisms. This approach 
requires a company to look within its individual entities, 
departments, and units, and then across those divisions to 
create a more complete risk picture. In this regard, COSO’s 
model for implementing ERM seeks to identify risks to the 
company’s objectives at every level of the enterprise (e.g., 
entity, department, unit) while focusing assessment and 







7 Information and communication
8 Monitoring
COSO suggests that effective implementation of ERM 
requires a top-down approach, with the board playing a 
critical role in fostering a risk-aware culture, setting the 
company’s risk appetite, and reconciling that appetite with 
the company’s risk profile.12
Procedures for implementing effective ERM programs are 
still emerging.13 ERM implementation requires the board 
and senior management to map out the company’s business 
strategies and potential barriers to those strategies. In fact, 
many companies use their strategic plans as blueprints for 
their ERM programs. A successful ERM program capitalizes 
on the synergies between mitigating a company’s risk exposure 
and achieving its strategic and operational objectives.14 
Boards must understand all elements of potential risks 
to align them with their companies’ risk appetites and 
strategic plans. That level of understanding requires effective 
communication across the enterprise, which companies can 
foster by establishing clear channels of communication and 
identifying risk owners. Many companies have implemented 
reporting systems for allegations concerning harassment, 
discrimination, and illegal activity. In fact, these types 
of whistleblower provisions are often incorporated into 
companies’ codes of ethics.15 Developing similar reporting 
systems for the identification of potential operational or 
financial risk events is one path to encourage meaningful 
risk communication.16
There is no one right way to implement ERM, and companies 
should tailor their ERM programs to their particular 
industry, strategic plan, and internal needs. Focusing on 
communication channels and risk ownership will help 
companies integrate risk assessment throughout the 
enterprise. Integration, in turn, will reduce the likelihood 
that risks become trapped in silos and underappreciated by 
boards and senior management.17 
Corporate Governance Considerations
In the United States, state law typically vests the board 
with management authority over the corporation.18 
Directors serve in a fiduciary capacity, with the company 
and its shareholders as the primary beneficiaries.19 As such, 
directors owe duties of care and loyalty, with the latter 
generally including an obligation of good faith.20 The duty 
of care generally requires directors to be fully informed and 
diligent when making their business decisions.21 The duty 
of loyalty mandates, among other things, that directors 
remain free from conflicts and act selflessly, in good faith, 
and with the corporation’s best interests at heart.22
An effective ERM program may help directors comply with 
their fiduciary duties in multiple respects. For example, in 
evaluating duty of care claims, courts typically consider 
whether directors were informed regarding the issue under 
consideration, made reasonable inquiries concerning the 
matter, understood key components and critiques of the 
proposed action, and were deliberative in their decision-
making process.23 ERM contributes positively to several 
of these factors.24 The enhanced communication and 
information flow underlying ERM should strengthen 
the utility of boards’ decision-making processes, making 
it more difficult for plaintiffs to overcome the board’s 
traditional protection under the business judgment rule.25
Moreover, monitoring and managing a company’s risks are 
at the core of ERM, which directly implicates directors’ duty 
to monitor. “The duty to monitor is an obligation to prevent 
harm to the corporation.”26 Although originally perceived 
as a subset of the duty of care, duty to monitor claims are 
now commonly viewed as invoking standards applicable to 
duty of loyalty claims. These standards require that plaintiffs 
establish, at a minimum, a knowing dereliction of duty or 
“a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise 
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists.”27 As 
the Delaware Court of Chancery explained in In re Citigroup 
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, these standards create 
an “extremely high burden” for plaintiffs.28
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In Citigroup, the plaintiffs argued that the directors breached 
their duty to monitor by not mitigating Citigroup’s risk 
exposure. Citigroup’s substantial investment in mortgage-
backed securities was a risk that led to significant shareholder 
losses and government bailouts. The plaintiffs argued that 
the Citigroup board ignored indicators of the deteriorating 
subprime mortgage market. Although the court recognized 
a board’s heightened duty to act when “red flags” suggest 
wrongdoing at the company, it found that the plaintiffs’ 
evidence was, at best, evidence of bad business decisions.29 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ asserted duty to monitor 
claims and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The business judgment rule ultimately protected the 
board’s decisions in Citigroup and in similar cases involving 
AIG and Goldman Sachs.30 Nevertheless, individuals 
serving on those boards were named as defendants in 
very high-profile, expensive lawsuits, and their decisions 
apparently did cause economic harm to their companies 
and shareholders—so any victory they attained was 
bittersweet in some respects. In addition, Citigroup and 
subsequent cases leave open the possibility of director 
liability for failures in monitoring and oversight.31 As 
then-Chancellor William Chandler explained in Citigroup, 
“A plaintiff can show bad faith conduct by, for example, 
properly alleging particularized facts that show that 
a director consciously disregarded an obligation to be 
reasonably informed about the business and its risks or 
consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee 
the business.”32
A thoughtful and integrated ERM program may enhance 
board protections in litigation and, more importantly, 
improve its decision-making processes. A board that 
implements and nurtures an ERM program will be 
overseeing the active identification and management of 
potential risks to the enterprise. If structured appropriately, 
the program should foster more complete and meaningful 
risk reports to the board and more coordinated responses 
to both enterprise-level risks and those being managed 
by individual departments and units. Indeed, an effective 
ERM program might well serve as a prophylactic measure 
against any purported breaches of the duty to monitor.
Regulatory Compliance Considerations
The corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the economic 
crisis of 2008 have led to enhanced regulation of company 
activities on multiple fronts. For example, Sarbanes-Oxley 
enhanced standards for corporate governance and reporting. 
The SEC amended its proxy guidelines to require disclosure 
of the board’s role in the company’s risk management.33 
The NYSE likewise revised its listing standards to redefine 
corporate independence, addressing both internal controls 
and codes of ethics, and specifically identifying risk 
management as a function of an audit committee.34 
Companies that fail to comply may be subject to agency 
investigations, litigation, and sanctions.35
Regulatory compliance is an integral part of ERM. 
A company cannot assess accurately its risk profile 
without a comprehensive understanding of the regulatory 
environment in which it operates. ERM may itself help 
a company comply with applicable regulations, reduce 
the impact of certain compliance failures, and produce 
other external benefits. For example, Standard & Poor’s 
considers the existence of an ERM program in rating any 
given company.36 ERM can complement and strengthen a 
company’s existing internal controls, code of ethics, and 
compliance culture.
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Other Considerations
In light of the potential governance and compliance 
benefits, the question shifts from why a company should 
implement ERM to why it would not. Like most initiatives, 
ERM has potential costs and implementation challenges 
that may limit its positive impact.37 The following section 
summarizes certain countervailing factors. Although each 
company must make its own assessment, on balance, ERM 
appears well worth the effort.
Increased cost ERM may be viewed as yet another layer 
of administrative expense that increases overhead and 
negatively impacts the bottom line.38 That perception may 
hold some truth. Companies may hire a chief risk officer 
or need additional personnel and resources to implement 
an ERM program. Some companies retain outside 
consultants to design their ERM programs and address 
related programmatic needs. ERM may also identify risks 
or potential issues that require mitigation plans and the 
expenditure of considerable resources to support those 
plans. Companies should be aware of the potential costs 
associated with any ERM program and factor those into 
their cost-benefit analysis. 
Additional work Similarly, ERM may be viewed as creating 
additional “busy work” that distracts managers from 
their primary responsibility—running the business.39 
This view of ERM as a “check-the-box” exercise done 
outside of ordinary job responsibilities undercuts the true 
value of ERM. Employees at all levels should identify and 
assess potential risks in the ordinary course of business 
on a daily basis. ERM is designed, in part, to underscore 
the importance of this integrated risk assessment—a task 
that boards, managers, and employees already should be 
undertaking. ERM is not new or additional work; it is a 
more disciplined and effective way to perform that work.
Impede innovation A pure risk identification and 
mitigation approach to ERM might suggest that companies 
forgo valuable, yet risky, opportunities. In other words, 
ERM might cause companies to become too risk averse.40 
That should not be the objective or result of a properly 
structured ERM program. Rather, companies should use 
ERM to reduce barriers to innovation and foster projects 
within the companies’ risk appetites.41
Minimal impact ERM has received mixed reviews 
regarding its impact on the bottom line. Some companies 
appear to have gotten lost in the process—almost paralyzed 
by the information output. A company that becomes 
consumed by the process itself or is unable to discern and 
address entity level and emerging risks likely will not realize 
much value from an ERM process.42 As one commentator 
notes, “ERM is only as effective as it is able to produce a 
risk radar that is meaningful and forward looking.”43 The 
value in ERM comes from understanding the companies’ 
objectives and designing an ERM program that minimizes 
barriers to the company’s forward trajectory.
Misunderstood Boards may reject ERM because they 
do not understand the concept or its application to their 
company. In 2011, a study of corporate directors indicated 
that boards have not increased the amount of time spent 
on reviewing and approving company risk management 
strategies and that they lack the requisite knowledge to 
do so.44 Directors reported dedicating only 14 percent 
of their time to risk management.45 In addition, boards 
may assign primary responsibility for ERM functions 
to the accounting or financial departments and, in the 
process, lose sight of the cross-functional goal of ERM.46 
Accordingly, before adopting any ERM program, boards 
should take the time to understand ERM and how it might 
assist the company in achieving its objectives.
Chart 2
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There has been a notable increase over prior years
in the percentage of organizations that have
formally designated an individual to serve
as the chief risk ofﬁcer (CRO) or 




Source: Mark Beasley, Bruce Branson, and Bonnie Hancock,
“Current State of Enterprise Risk Oversight: Progress Is Occurring
but Opportunities for Improvement Remain,” July 2012, 17.
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Potential Upside with Little Downside Risk
ERM can facilitate sound corporate governance practices 
that are likely to have a positive impact on multiple aspects 
of a company’s operations.47
With proper planning, companies can implement ERM 
in a manner that mitigates more than financial risk. 
They can improve communication and discipline in their 
decision-making processes and address cross-functional 
risks such as legal, operational, and personnel matters. In 
addition, effective ERM programs may help boards comply 
with various legal rules and regulations and satisfy their 
fiduciary duties to companies and shareholders.
Admittedly, there are challenges associated with ERM, and 
companies should not undertake an ERM program half-
heartedly. Nonetheless, studies suggest that, if executed 
properly, ERM increases the flow of risk information and 
leads to better-informed decisions, greater consensus, 
and better communication with management—i.e., better 
management.48 “Better management translates into the 
increased ability to meet strategic goals, reduced earnings 
volatility, and increased profitability.”49 Accordingly, any 
downside risk associated with ERM likely is outweighed by 
its potential value.
Table 1





Rank Percent Rank Percent
Better informed decisions** 1 86% 1 58%
Greater management consensus*** 2 83 2 36
Increased management accountability*** 3 79 3 34
Smoother government practices*** 4 79 4 39
Ability to meet strategic goals*** 5 76 5 36
Better communication to board+ 6 69 6 52
Reduced earnings volatility** 7 62 7 37
Increased proﬁ tability** 8 59 8 33
Use risk as competitive tool** 9 46 9 22
Accurate risk-adjusted pricing* 10 41 10 21
*** 99.9% likelihood of signiﬁ cant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
  ** 99% likelihood of signiﬁ cant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
    * 95% likelihood of signiﬁ cant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
    + 90% likelihood of signiﬁ cant difference between advanced ERM and all other companies
Source: Matteo Tonello, Emerging Governance Practices in Enterprise Risk Management, The Conference Board 
R-1398-07-WG, February 2007.
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